Not Born Yesterday

1. Humans are wired for "Open Vigilance," not Gullibility.

On the contrary, we are skilled at figuring out who to trust and what to believe, and, if anything, we’re too hard rather than too easy to influence.

Challenging the stereotype. For centuries, thinkers from Plato to modern psychologists have portrayed humans as hopelessly gullible, easily swayed by demagogues, crowds, or authority. This view is often supported by historical events like the Athenian blunders or the Children's Crusade, and psychological experiments such as Asch's conformity studies or Milgram's obedience experiments, which seem to show people blindly following others against their own judgment or conscience.

Evolutionary imperative. However, from an evolutionary perspective, widespread gullibility is unsustainable. If individuals were truly credulous, they would be constantly exploited by others, leading to a breakdown of communication and cooperation. Instead, evolution favors cognitive mechanisms that allow us to be both open to beneficial information and vigilant against harmful or deceptive messages.

The "open vigilance" system. These "open vigilance" mechanisms are fundamental to human interaction, enabling us to navigate complex social environments. They ensure that communication remains largely honest by imposing costs on unreliable senders and allowing receivers to filter information critically. This inherent skepticism means that, far from being easily influenced, humans are often quite resistant to persuasion.

2. Communication's Stability Demands Discerning Receivers.

Unless the reproductive fates of two entities are perfectly intertwined, incentives to send unreliable signals are pretty much guaranteed to exist.

The cost of blind trust. The idea that humans are gullible often assumes that individuals being copied are always acting in good faith. However, in any interaction where interests are not perfectly aligned – which is most human interactions – there's an incentive for senders to manipulate receivers for their own benefit. This is evident even in biological relationships, like the hormonal "tug-of-war" between a pregnant mother and her fetus over resources.

Evolutionary solutions for honesty. To maintain stable communication in the face of diverging interests, evolutionary pressures have led to mechanisms that ensure signals are largely honest. For instance, Thomson's gazelles "stot" (jump high) to signal their fitness to predators, a costly display that cannot be faked by weaker individuals. Similarly, bowerbirds build elaborate bowers, not as a direct cost, but as a signal of quality maintained by the vigilance of rival birds who sabotage exaggerated displays.

Human communication's unique challenge. Unlike animal signals, human verbal communication is "cheap talk" – it costs little to utter a lie. Therefore, human communication relies heavily on cognitive mechanisms that evaluate information and track sender reliability. This "open vigilance" minimizes exposure to unreliable signals and imposes reputational costs on dishonest communicators, ensuring that communication remains mostly beneficial for receivers.

3. Our Minds Prioritize Skepticism Over Blind Acceptance.

If our more recent and sophisticated cognitive machinery is disrupted, we revert to our conservative core, becoming more stubborn rather than more gullible.

Beyond the "arms race" analogy. Traditional views often depict vigilance as an "arms race" where sophisticated manipulators exploit less discerning minds, suggesting that impaired cognition leads to gullibility. This model is flawed. Human communication has dramatically expanded in scope and complexity, akin to an omnivore's diet, requiring both greater openness and greater vigilance.

Stubbornness, not credulity. When higher cognitive functions are compromised – for example, through brainwashing, subliminal messaging, or distraction – people don't become more gullible. Instead, they become more resistant to new information, especially if it conflicts with existing beliefs.

• Brainwashing attempts during the Korean War yielded minimal conversions (0.5% of POWs).
• Subliminal advertising has proven largely ineffective.
• Distracted individuals tend to reject information, not accept it blindly.

System 1's discerning nature. Even "System 1" (fast, intuitive thinking), often labeled as gullible, is far from it. Experiments show that people spontaneously reject statements incompatible with their background knowledge or from untrustworthy sources. This inherent conservatism means that, by default, our minds are biased towards rejecting messages, particularly those that challenge our established worldview, rather than blindly accepting them.

4. Message Content is Judged by Plausibility and Argument Strength.

As a rule, when people are presented with messages from credible sources that challenge their views, they move some of the way toward incorporating this new information into their worldview.

Plausibility as a first filter. When evaluating new information, our minds first check its compatibility with existing beliefs – a process called plausibility checking. While the "backfire effect" (strengthening beliefs when presented with contrary evidence) is sometimes observed, it is rare. More often, people adjust their views, especially when the source is credible and the information is not deeply entrenched.

The power of reasoning. Beyond mere plausibility, humans possess reasoning mechanisms that evaluate the strength of arguments. Good arguments can change minds even on complex or counter-intuitive issues, as seen in mathematical proofs or scientific paradigm shifts (e.g., plate tectonics). This process is vigilant because it only accepts conclusions when the underlying inferences are intuitively compelling.

• People are just as likely to recognize a sound argument even if its conclusion strongly contradicts their initial belief (e.g., the Paul, Linda, and John puzzle).
• Discussion groups exchanging arguments improve performance in various tasks, from forecasting to medical diagnoses.

Intuitive pitfalls. However, the effectiveness of plausibility checking and reasoning depends on the quality of our "prior beliefs and inferences." In domains where our intuitions are systematically flawed or evolutionarily novel, such as complex scientific concepts (e.g., evolution, vaccine efficacy) or large-scale political systems, people can converge on intuitive but mistaken beliefs. These misconceptions often spread not because of persuasion, but because they resonate with pre-existing, albeit flawed, cognitive biases.

5. Trust is Earned Through Competence and Aligned Interests.

By default, statements are attributed to the speaker’s ability to draw inferences, which becomes the main locus for estimations of competence: we believe people more if we think them better at drawing inferences (in the relevant domain).

Beyond mere information access. Knowing who has access to information is crucial, but not enough. We also assess a source's competence. This is often based on past performance – a track record of getting things right in a specific domain. Even young children demonstrate this by directing questions about toys to other children and about food to adults, or choosing a mechanic over a doctor for elevator questions.

The wisdom of crowds, with caveats. While abstract statistics on majority opinion (like the Condorcet jury theorem) are often misunderstood, people intuitively grasp the power of collective wisdom when presented with individual opinions. They are more likely to follow a larger, more consensual group, especially if its members are perceived as competent and independent. However, this isn't blind conformity; people resist group pressure when their own perceptions are clear, as shown in variations of the Asch experiments.

Incentives for honesty. Trustworthiness is paramount. We are adept at discerning when others' incentives align with ours, whether naturally (e.g., coordinating to move furniture) or socially (e.g., through reputation). When incentives align, we give more weight to their statements. Conversely, self-interested claims are heavily discounted. This sensitivity to incentives, rather than unreliable behavioral cues like microexpressions (which have a correlation of 0 with deception), is key to deciding who to trust.

6. Emotional Responses are Selective, Not Simply Contagious.

Instead, they adapt according to a number of factors, including our preexisting plans or beliefs, the context, and the source’s credibility.

Debunking emotional contagion. The idea that emotions spread like pathogens, causing automatic and uncontrollable reactions, is a pervasive but flawed analogy. If emotions were truly contagious, they would be easily exploited, leading to maladaptive outcomes. For example, displays of anger would be counterproductive if they only made others angry in return.

Emotional vigilance in action. Our emotional responses are automatic but not mandatory. They are filtered by "emotional vigilance," which assesses the appropriateness of an emotional display. Even toddlers demonstrate this by:

• Ignoring a mother's fear signals on a safe slope.
• Showing less concern for unjustified sadness.
• Holding unreliable emoters accountable, trusting them less in future interactions.
  Adults also adjust their emotional mimicry based on cooperation/competition contexts and source credibility.

Rational crowds, not panicked mobs. Historical accounts of "mass psychogenic illnesses" or "panicked crowds" are often misinterpretations. These phenomena typically affect small, interconnected groups under stress, and the behaviors are often adaptive (e.g., attracting attention to poor working conditions). Crowds, even in emergencies, tend to be rational and selective in their actions, showing discrimination and restraint rather than succumbing to irrational, contagious passions.

7. Mass Persuasion Attempts Consistently Fall Flat.

The vast majority of mass persuasion efforts, from propaganda to po liti cal campaigns, from religious proselytizing to advertising, end in abject failure.

The illusion of influence. Despite enormous resources poured into mass persuasion, from ancient demagogues to modern advertisers, these efforts rarely achieve their intended effect. The historical record shows that figures like Cleon or Hitler gained power by echoing existing popular sentiments, not by manipulating a credulous populace. Their influence waned when their policies diverged from public opinion or faced real-world failures.

Propaganda's limited reach. Even totalitarian regimes with monopolistic control over media, like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, found their propaganda largely ineffective at changing core beliefs.

• Nazi propaganda had a "negligible impact on the Nazis’ electoral fortunes" and failed to turn Germans into rabid anti-Semites or make them like the party.
• Soviet propaganda failed to resonate with the population, leading to widespread distrust.
• Chinese government propaganda is largely ineffective, with citizens actively seeking alternative information.
  Propaganda could reinforce existing prejudices or provide justification for actions, but it failed to instill new values or generate genuine support, often leading to public cynicism and distrust.

Minimal effects in democracies. In democracies, political campaigns and advertising also demonstrate minimal persuasive power. Studies show that campaign efforts have negligible long-term effects on voting behavior in salient elections. Advertising primarily provides information about product characteristics, rather than fundamentally altering consumer preferences. Mass persuasion struggles because it cannot replicate the nuanced, trust-based interactions that drive genuine individual influence.

8. Misconceptions Thrive on Intuitive Appeal and Social Utility.

The spread of most misconceptions is explained by their intuitively appealing content, rather than by the skills of those who propound them.

Intuition over persuasion. Many widespread misconceptions, from anti-vaccination sentiments to conspiracy theories, gain traction not because of master persuaders, but because they tap into intuitive cognitive biases. For instance:

• The idea of injecting a "bit of disease" into a healthy baby (vaccination) intuitively screams folly.
• Creationism resonates with our innate understanding of designed artifacts.
• Flat-earthers appeal to the direct perception of a flat horizon.

Mind candy and social currency. False rumors often spread because they are "mind candy" – information that is relevant (e.g., about threats, celebrities, conspiracies) but lacks practical consequences for the receiver. People share these rumors to gain social points, appearing interesting or well-informed, without necessarily believing them deeply. The "rumeur d'Orléans" about Jewish shopkeepers kidnapping girls spread because it was titillating, not because people genuinely believed it and acted on it.

Strategic avoidance of debunking. The lack of practical consequences for these "mind candy" rumors means they are rarely rigorously tested against reality. Furthermore, individuals tend to avoid sharing such rumors with those most likely to debunk them, preserving their social utility within like-minded circles. This selective transmission, combined with their intuitive appeal, allows misconceptions to persist and spread without requiring widespread gullibility.

9. "Reflective Beliefs" Allow Holding Absurd Ideas Without Deep Conviction.

Believing something—a rumor or anything else—is not an all-or-nothing matter. Believing depends on what you do with a given piece of information.

Shallow acceptance of the absurd. Many seemingly absurd beliefs, from the Christian Trinity to the flat earth theory, are held as "reflective beliefs." These are ideas assented to intellectually but not deeply integrated into our intuitive cognitive systems or daily actions. For example, Christians may describe God as omniscient but implicitly think of Him as having a limited attention span when praying.

Cognitive compartmentalization. This cognitive compartmentalization prevents counterintuitive ideas from wreaking havoc on our fundamental understanding of the world. If our brains could truly process the idea that we’re darting across space at tremendous speeds following complex curves, we would constantly suffer from motion sickness. Similarly, flat-earthers, despite their claims, still navigate the world as if it were spherical, demonstrating a disconnect between their professed belief and their intuitive understanding.

Limited practical impact. The shallow nature of these beliefs means they often have minimal practical consequences. Most 9/11 "truthers" don't act as if the government is actively hunting them, and those who believed the Pizzagate conspiracy rarely took direct action. This "inert" quality allows such beliefs to persist without being challenged by real-world feedback, as they don't significantly guide inferences or actions.

10. Self-Incriminating Statements Serve Strategic Social Goals.

Professing false beliefs doesn’t need to be irrational, not by a long shot.

The persuasive power of confession. Self-incriminating statements, like confessions, are incredibly persuasive because they appear to defy self-interest. This makes them seem highly credible, often outweighing contradictory evidence. However, false confessions are distressingly common, often coerced or made by vulnerable individuals under pressure, yet they are routinely believed by juries and even interrogators. Jeffrey Deskovic spent 16 years in jail despite DNA evidence contradicting his coerced confession.

Burning bridges for loyalty. Absurd public pronouncements, such as lavish praise for dictators (e.g., Kim Jong-il's teleportation abilities) or extreme academic theories, are often strategic "burning bridges" signals. By expressing views that alienate most of society, individuals credibly signal their unwavering loyalty to a specific, often fringe, group. This makes them "unclubbable" by others, cementing their commitment to the chosen group.

Perverse use of vigilance. These seemingly irrational behaviors are not signs of gullibility but a perverse application of open vigilance. Individuals use their understanding of how others evaluate messages to strategically profess beliefs that serve their social goals – whether to gain leniency, secure group membership, or antagonize rivals. The more extreme and socially costly the belief, the stronger the signal of commitment, even if the belief itself is held only reflectively.

11. "Fake News" Primarily Justifies Existing Views, Rather Than Creating Them.

As a rule, it is wanting to commit atrocities that makes you believe absurdities.

Justification, not causation. Many misguided or wicked beliefs, from the humoral theory of disease to blood libels and modern "fake news," are less consequential than commonly assumed. They often serve as post-hoc justifications for actions or decisions people already intend to make, rather than being the primary cause of those actions.

• Physicians practiced bloodletting for centuries because it felt intuitively right, not solely due to Galen's theories.
• Rumors of blood libel in Kishinev (1903) justified existing desires for violence and plunder, rather than causing them.

The demand for rationalization. Humans are social beings constantly seeking to justify their behaviors and opinions to others, and even to themselves. This creates a "market for justifications." When people are predisposed to certain actions (e.g., ethnic violence, voting for a particular candidate), they actively seek out information, including "fake news," that rationalizes their stance. This explains why pro-Trump fake news was consumed by "intense partisans" who already supported him.

Polarization and echo chambers. While social media is often blamed for increasing political polarization through "echo chambers," evidence suggests this is often exaggerated. Social media users are frequently exposed to diverse views, and actual ideological polarization is less widespread than perceived. Instead, the "strengthening of views" often comes from accumulating reinforcing arguments, which can lead to increased confidence and affective polarization (dislike of the opposing side), but not necessarily a fundamental shift in core beliefs.

12. Gurus Exploit Reputation and Coarse Cues, Not Inherent Credulity.

The wide spread of scientific ideas, in spite of their apparent implausibility, has been underpinned by the solid, even if not unblemished, foundations of trust the scientific enterprise rests on.

Deference to perceived expertise. People often defer to individuals or institutions perceived as highly knowledgeable, even when the ideas presented are incomprehensible or counterintuitive. This deference is not blind gullibility but a reliance on "reputation credit" and "coarse cues." For example, Alex Jones gains credibility by constantly warning of threats, even if those threats are remote or fabricated, allowing him to sell related products.

The "guru effect" and obscurity. Obscure or complex language, like that of Jacques Lacan or some postmodern thinkers, can paradoxically enhance a guru's perceived profundity. Followers, assuming the guru's expertise, invest significant effort in deciphering the opaque prose, interpreting it in myriad ways, and reinforcing the illusion of deep meaning. This social dynamic, where admitting confusion is seen as intellectual failure, perpetuates the guru's influence.

Navigating modern information. In a world of specialized knowledge, most people cannot deeply evaluate every claim. They rely on coarse cues like:

• Academic credentials (e.g., PhDs).
• Scientific jargon (e.g., adding neuroscience data to poor explanations).
• Institutional prestige (e.g., Yale in Milgram's experiments).
  While these cues are generally adaptive, they can be exploited by pseudoscientists or con artists. The challenge is to refine our use of these cues, prioritize well-established consensus over flashy new results, and actively question claims, especially when they are unnecessarily obscure.